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L Introduction
In April 1993, the National Football League (NFL or League) and the
National Football League Players Association (NFLPA or Association)
entered into a collective bargaining agreement that will govern their relation-
ship into the year 2000.1 Several provisions of that contract, most notably
those limiting monies teams may spend on salaries for veteran players (salary
cap)2 and first year players (rookie salary cap),3 as well as rules foreclosing
mobility for a single so-called "franchise" player,4 have greatly affected NFL
teams5 and have engendered well-publicized and bitter criticism from play-
ers,6 coaches,7 and observers8 of the NFL.
1. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 1993-2000.
2. Id. at art. XXLV, §§ 3-4.
3. Id. at art. XVII, § 3.
4. Id. at art. XX, §§ 1-17.
5. See Vito Stellino, Redskins Get Down and Cheap, BALTIMORE SUN, July 7, 1994,
at Cl (describing Washington Redskins' release of fifteen veteran players to reduce its player
payroll from $52 million, spent in 1993, to $34.6 million, as required by cap). Many veteran
players were released, including Art Monk, the NFL's career leader in receptions, who
declined the Washington Redskins' offer of $600,000 for the 1994 season. Monk Skins Part,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 7, 1994, at D3. The team reported that it reduced Monk's salary,
which had been $1.15 million in 1993, because of the salary cap. Id. Linebacker Kurt
Gouveia's salary was reduced from $1.02 million to $500,000. Stellino, supra.
Other teams with highly paid veterans, including the San Francisco 49ers, the Buffalo
Bills, the New York Giants, and the Dallas Cowboys, also felt the effect of the cap, losing
some veteran players and reducing the salaries of others. See Dave Goldberg, Commish to
Coaches: Put a Cap on It, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Apr. 27, 1994, at C8; see also
Tagliabue Tries to Back Off, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1994, at C2. New York Giants Quarter-
back Phil Simms attributed his release directly to the cap. Tagliabue Tries to Back Off,
supra. The roster of virtually every team was affected by the cap. See id.; see also Perry
A. Farrell, Cap Dance: Lions Switch Linebackers, DET. FREE PRESS, July 16, 1994, at B1.
For a description of the effect of the rookie salary cap on NFL teams, see Jason Cole,
In Era of Salary Cap, Have Agents Become Superfluous?, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale),
July 10, 1994, at C16 (suggesting that rookie salaries have become standardized under cap);
Stellino, supra (noting that teams must cut salaries of other players to accommodate rookie
salaries); E.M. Swift, On the Spot, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 5, 1994, at 33 (explaining
that rookies will have to play at starting positions because teams have cut veteran players to
accommodate salary cap).
6. Player bitterness about the agreement was widespread. See S.A. Paolantonio, A Lot
of Players Would Just Love to Scrap the Cap Their Union Accepted, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, May 8, 1994, at C9; cf Gordon Forbes, Cap Critics Vent Frustration - Agents,
Older Players Say Pay System Unbalanced, USA TODAY, May 5, 1994, at C10. Miami
Dolphins linebacker Bryan Cox stated that the NFL owners "whipped our butts" in negotia-
tions, and Reggie White described the salary cap as "definitely too low." Paolantonio, supra.
Players often blamed the NFLPA for having agreed to the arrangement. Disturbed by the
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Under most circumstances, the inclusion of such provisions in a bona
fide collective bargaining agreement would insulate them from antitrust
scrutiny under the nonstatutory exemption to the antitrust laws? As this
Article will demonstrate, however, the NFL and the NFLPA (collectively,
the Parties) violated well-established principles of labor law by negotiating
their contract at a time when the NFLPA was officially decertified and
therefore was no longer the players' collective bargaining representative. As
a result, their contract cannot be said to be the product of bona fide, arm's-
length collective bargaining - a prerequisite to antitrust immunity under the
nonstatutory labor exemption.'"
The consequences of these facts are plain: The Parties' unlawfully
created collective bargaining contract will not shield the salary caps, the
Peace; Cowboys Irvin, Smith Shout About Labor Deal, THE REcoRD (Bergen, N.J.), May 8,
1993, at B5; Goldberg, supra note 5, at C8 ("When... executive director Gene Upshaw
briefed the Super Bowl champion Dallas Cowboys on terms of the seven-year agreement...
Michael Irvin and Emmitt Smith shouted at him, then walked out of the meeting.").
7. Manny Topol, Tags Gags NFL Team Officials, NEWSDAY (New York), Apr. 26,
1994, at A71. Tampa Bay Buccaneers coach Sam Wyche was quoted as saying "[aill of us
are going to have to let go players who should be on our teams . . . ." Id. Several team
officials, including the general managers of the Buffalo Bills and Green Bay Packers and the
head coach of the New York Giants, expressed similar frustration at having lost veteran
players as a result of the cap. Goldberg, supra note 5. Indeed, so bitter and widespread was
the criticism of the salary cap that NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue issued a memorandum
excoriating general managers and coaches for complaining about the cap and warning that
future criticism could result in fines of up to $10,000 for "conduct detrimental to the league."
Heisman Winner is Non Pick, FRESNO BEE, Apr. 26, 1994, at C3; Salisbury Agrees to 1-Year
Deal with Oilers, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Apr. 26, 1994, at C7; Topol, supra.
8. Bob Kravitz, Defense Still Missing From Broncos' Formula, RoCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Apr. 25, 1994, at B2 (condemning "Gene Upshaw and his band of thieves, who
ridiculously agreed to this salary cap without the agreement of the union's constituency").
Sports agent Steve Feldman explained, "The cap is absolutely the worst thing that ever
happened to pro football .... Ten to 12 players will get huge amounts of money. Thirty
or 35 on the other side of the locker room will be making $200,000." Forbes, supra note 6.
The importance of the salary cap to players and teams in other sports has been
remarkable. See Richard Justice, Baseball Proposes Salary Cap; Move Heats Up Talk of
Strike, WASH. POST, June 15, 1994, at D1 (discussing salary cap proposal for baseball
players). Disagreement over salary cap proposals, of course, were at the heart of negotiations
in baseball which ultimately resulted in the 1994 work stoppage and the cancellation of the
championship season. See Cynthia Lambert, Goodenow Warns Wings Players of Possible
Lockout by Owners, DET. FREE PRESS, Sept. 14, 1994, at F1. In addition, before ultimately
reaching an agreement, the National Hockey League and the NHL Players' Association were
deadlocked on the issue.
9. See infra Part Ill.B.1 (discussing nonstatutory labor exemption).
10. See infra note 64 and accompanying text (listing prerequisites for application of
nonstatutory labor exemption).
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franchise player designation, or any other anticompetitive contractual provi-
sion from substantive antitrust challenge. Given that the nonstatutory labor
exemption is the primary impediment to such a challenge" - and that
similar challenges to other player restraint mechanisms have universally
succeeded when subjected to antitrust examination 2 - the significance of
this thesis should be apparent.
II. Overview
Part III of this Article reviews the recent history of the Parties' collec-
tive bargaining relationship. This history reveals that the Association's long-
standing efforts to modify rules limiting player mobility through collective
bargaining and through the 1987 work stoppage were wholly unsuccessful.
13
Indeed, between 1987 and 1993, the Parties operated without a collective
bargaining agreement, and the rules limiting player mobility were unilater-
ally imposed by the NFL.14
At the same time, individual player antitrust challenges to those player
restraint rules were foreclosed. This outcome was fixed in 1989 by Powell
v. NFL," in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that the "ongoing collective bargaining relationship" between the
League and the Association rendered the rules exempt from antitrust scrutiny
under the nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws.
16
11. But see infra note 114 (explaining that analysis in White v. NFL, 836 F. Supp. 1508
(D. Minn. 1993), aft'd, 41 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2569 (1995),
may effectively prevent class members from challenging current collective bargaining
agreement).
12. See Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007-08 (D. Minn. 1975) (holding that
Rozelle Rule violated antitrust laws under per se and rule of reason tests), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); see also
Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 744-47 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that NFL
draft and other restrictions violated antitrust laws under per se and rule of reason tests), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp.
867,; 890-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding NBA player restraint system constituted per se
violation of antitrust laws). Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82-83 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (holding
that Rozelle Rule, draft, and other rules violated antitrust laws under rule of reason test),
aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979).
13. See Strike Chronology, TIMES UNION (Albany), Oct. 16, 1987, at D2 (chron-
ologizing events of 1987 NFL strike).
14. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing player restraint rules
imposed by NFL between 1987 and 1993).
15. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
16. Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040
(1991). For purposes of brevity, this doctrine will be referred to in this Article as the "labor
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Because the salary caps, franchise player designation, and other poten-
tially anticompetitive rules contained in the Parties' current agreement are
free from antitrust scrutiny only if they fall within the labor exemption, some
digression from the chronicle of events is necessary to discuss this doctrine
and its prerequisites. Part III of this Article, therefore, also briefly reviews
the history, role, and requirements of the labor exemption to the antitrust
laws.
This review shows that anticompetitive agreements between labor and
management may be shielded from antitrust challenge only if they meet three
now well-established and defined criteria.'7 First, the agreement must
primarily affect the parties themselves, and not strangers to their relation-
ship. Next, the matter under scrutiny must concern a mandatory subject of
bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).'5 Finally, and
most germane to the thesis of this Article, the agreement must be the product
of bona fide, arm's-length collective bargaining - a prerequisite that is
lacking in the Parties' current contract. 9
Returning to the sequence of events leading to the current collective
bargaining agreement, this Article shows that the practical effect of the
Eighth Circuit's holding in Powell was that the labor exemption would
remain an obstacle to individual antitrust challenges to the player mobility
restraints as long as a collective bargaining relationship between the NFL
and the NFLPA continued.
Consequently - and within two days following the court's decision in
Powell - the NFLPA began the process of officially terminating its status
as the players' collective bargaining representative. The NFLPA took this
unusual, even extreme, step for the avowed purpose of ending its collective
bargaining relationship with the League and thereby extinguishing the labor
exemption as a barrier to individual antitrust actions by players."
Immediately thereafter, NFL players brought individual antitrust actions
challenging League rules restricting their movement among teams. And,
shed of the labor exemption, they met with immediate success. In Septem-
exemption."
17. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614-15 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing prerequisites
to qualifying for labor exemption to antitrust laws), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
19. See infra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing prerequisite of arm's-length
collective bargaining relationship to application of labor exemption)
20. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (discussing NFLPA's termination of
its status as collective bargaining representative following decision of United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd,
930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991)).
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ber 1992 a federal court jury in McNeil v. NFL21 found the NFL rule govern-
ing player mobility then in effect? to be violative of the antitrust laws and
awarded damages of $1.63 million and unrestricted free agency to four of
the eight player plaintiffs.' Within two weeks, Reggie White and four other
players lodged a similar suit against the NFL seeking free agency and
damages. 24
On February 26, 1993 the NFL and the NFLPA settled the matter of
White v. NFL.2 That settlement, which comprised nearly two hundred
pages, included the specific terms of what would later become the Parties'
collective bargaining agreement after the NFL again recognized the NFLPA
as the players' representative. At the time of the Parties' settlement,
however, the NFLPA was avowedly and purposely no longer the players'
collective bargaining representative.
The thesis of this Article is straightforward: Under firmly established
principles of labor law, employers and unions are forbidden from negotiating
or entering into agreements unless and until a majority of the employees
themselves have expressed their desire to be so represented. This princi-
ple, discussed in Part IV, grows out of our nation's historical experience
with so-called "company unions" - organizations created or fostered by
employers for the purpose of avoiding bona fide, arm's-length collective
bargaining with their employees' freely selected representatives.' In this
instance, the contract between the NFL and the NFLPA was negotiated at a
time when the NFLPA was indisputably, and by design, not the players'
collective bargaining representative.
21. Civ. No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992).
22. The rule under examination in McNeil was the so-called "Plan B," which in effect
restrained 37 of the 55 players on each team from contracting with other teams. Jeffrey Pash,
Free Agency Litigation in the National Football League, PRAC. L. INST., Mar.-Apr. 1993,
at 3-4.
23. McNeil v. NFL, Civ. No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 10,
1992); Richard Sandomir, Judge Holds Key to NFL's Future, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 11,
1992, at 5 (Sports).
24. White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Minn. 1993) ("Plaintiffs filed the
present antitrust class action on September 21, 1992, less than two weeks after a jury
rendered its verdict in McNeil v. NFL.") (citation omitted).
25. Id. at 1395-96. For a description of the role of the NFLPA in the White litigation
and its settlement, see infra part V.
26. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text (discussing initiation and settlement
of White case).
27. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text (discussing NLRA's prohibition on
employer interference with employees' formation of unions).
28. Id.
402
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Because the League recognized and bargained a contract with an organi-
zation - the NFLPA - that had deliberately ceased to be the players'
collective bargaining representative, the 1993-2000 NFL-NFLPA collective
bargaining contract cannot be said to be the product of bona fide, arm's-
length bargaining. Consequently, their contract failed the last of the criteria
necessary to shelter the provisions from antitrust examination. The signifi-
cance of this sequence of events is inescapable: The Parties' defectively
made collective bargaining contract will not, as they surely assume, shield
the salary caps, the franchise player designation, or any other allegedly anti-
competitive element contained within it from individual antitrust challenge.
Ilf. The Parties' Relationship
A. The 1987Negotiations
Until the NFL and the NFLPA settled their long-standing differences
in April 1993 and reached their current agreement, labor and management
in professional football had operated without a contract since August 1987.
At that time, the primary disagreement between the Parties - as has so often
been the case - revolved around the inherent conflict in professional team
sports between the players' desire to freely market their services and the
teams' desire to restrain player mobility.29
In 1987 the particular restraints giving rise to labor-management strife
were those limiting player free agency. The NFLPA sought in negotiations
to modify the so-called "first refusal/compensation system" then in effect.
Under that system, a player's current team had the right to match any offer
made by another NFL team and thereby retain the player. Even if the
current team elected not to match the offer, it was still entitled to "compen-
29. The tension between player restraint mechanisms and players' desire to freely
market their services has been among the most long-standing and distinctive themes in sports
law. Player restraints have existed since at least the advent of the reserve system in profes-
sional baseball in 1879 and have given rise to much of the significant unrest and litigation
since that time. See generally Robert A. McCormick, Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph
of Collective Bargaining in Professional Baseball, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1131 (1982). For
examples of such lawsuits, see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (baseball); Powell v.
NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988) (football), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (hockey), vacated, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. NFL, 407
F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975) (football), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (basketball); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (football),
aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). See also Robert
McCormick, Court Tackles NFL Players, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 28, 1988, at 13, 13-14 (discuss-
ing Powell case).
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sation" from the new team in the form of draft choices - the number and
quality of which depended primarily upon transferring the player's salary
with the new team.'
The Parties could not resolve their differences and in September 1987
the NFLPA began a league-wide work stoppage." As even casual observers
will remember, the strike was rendered ineffectual when teams hired replace-
ment players,32 veteran players crossed picket lines,33 and games proceeded
uninterrupted.' 4 Three weeks later, the NFLPA capitulated and players
returned to work without a contract 5 - a status that continued until 1993.
B. Powell v. NFL
Having failed to obtain greater freedom for its members through collec-
tive bargaining and economic pressure, the NFLPA turned next to the
antitrust laws and the federal courts. In October 1987 Marvin Powell, then-
NFLPA President, filed suit on behalf of the Association and a group of
players challenging essentially every element of the NFL player restraint
system. The suit challenged, among other things, the college draft, the first
30. Pash, supra note 22, at 2. The first refusal/compensation system had been preceded
by the so-called "Rozelle Rule." Id. at 1-2. Under that rule, when a free agent moved to a
new team the two teams would attempt to agree upon appropriate compensation, as in a trade.
Id. at 1. If the teams were unable to agree, the NFL Commissioner was empowered to
resolve disputes by awarding a different player or other compensation to the former team.
Id. In Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977), the court determined that
the Rozelle Rule violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Mackey, 407 F.
Supp. at 1007-08.
31. Strike Chronology, supra note 13. The 1,585 NFLPA members struck following
the Monday night game on September 22. Id.
32. See Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989
DUKE L.J. 339, 367.
33. Strike Chronology, supra note 13. In the first full day of the strike, September 23,
1987, two prominent players, Mark Wilson and Gary Hogeboom, crossed the picket line.
Id. By September 30, 1987, 15 more players had abandoned the strike, including Danny
White, the quarterback of the Dallas Cowboys. Id. By October 7, 1987, 129 players had
returned to work. Id. One week later, on the final day to report and to be paid for the week,
the NFL's Most Valuable Player in 1986, Lawrence Taylor, as well as All-Pros Steve Largent
and Andre Tippett, reported to work, swelling the total to 228. Id.
34. Lock, supra note 32, at 357, 367; cf. Ed Garvey, Foreword to Ethan Lock, The
Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports: A Perspective on Collective Bargaining
in the NFL, 1989 DUKE L.J. 328, 330 (discussing ease with which NFL thwarted Players'
strike in 1987).
35. Pash, supra note 22, at 3; see also Strike Chronology, supra note 13. On October
15, 1987 the 24-day strike ended as the NFLPA officially abandoned the strike and instructed
players to return to work without a contract. Strike Chronology, supra note 13.
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refusal/compensation scheme, and the standard player contract on the
grounds that they unlawfully restrained trade in the market for players'
services.36
The threshold and more significant question in Powell, however, was
whether the labor exemption shielded the League and the player restraint
rules from antitrust scrutiny. This issue was the linchpin to the challenge;
if the rules fell within the labor exemption, their anticompetitive effects were
beyond the purview of the antitrust laws.37
1. The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws
The nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws was pivotal to the
resolution of Powell. Because its requirements are also central to this
Article's thesis, some discussion of the origin and development of this doc-
trine is essential.
The nonstatutory labor exemption doctrine is an outgrowth of the
United States Supreme Court's efforts to harmonize national antitrust and
labor policies.' As has been abundantly explicated elsewhere, those policies
36. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 778 & n.1 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d
1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
37. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing duration of labor exemption).
38. The so-called nonstatutory labor exemption, as its name denotes, should be distin-
guished from the exemption accorded specific unilateral union activities under §§ 6 and 20
of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 6, 20, 38 Stat. 730, 731, 738 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (1994) and 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994)). Judicial review of congressional efforts to create
an antitrust exemption for labor has limited the statutory exemption to specific unilateral
union activities. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Stearnfitters Local Union
No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622-26 (1975) (concluding that multi-employer collective bargaining
agreement was not entitled to antitrust exemption because it placed direct restraints on
subcontractor competition); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233-37 (1941)
(concluding that conventional union activities directed at rival union are not prohibited by
antitrust laws); cf. Milton Handler & William C. Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the
AntitustLaws: The Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 475-83
(1981) (discussing Supreme Court cases interpreting statutory exemption). Negotiated agree-
ments between unions and employers, therefore, are not subject to the statutory exemption.
See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965) (concluding that attempt to impose
industry-wide standards in negotiated agreement with employer would not be entitled to statu-
tory antitrust exemption).
As early as 1941, however, the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Hutche-
son, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), that accommodating antitrust and labor policy required that some
labor-management agreements be accorded a nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws.
Id. at 233-37 (discussing broad legislative purpose behind Congress' enactment of labor
statutes); see also Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-23. As Justice Goldberg observed, to do
otherwise would permit unions and employers to conduct "industrial warfare" but would
405
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are in some important ways inherently at cross-purposes. 9 Antitrust law
seeks to preserve free economic competition, 4' but labor law protects collec-
tive bargaining and certain union or concerted employee activities.4
Unions are by their nature and purpose anticompetitive.42 As the United
States Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly, a central goal of the labor
prohubit them from peacefully resolving their disputes. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 712 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
39. See generally EDWARD B. MILLER, ANTITRUST LAWS AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
(1984); Archibald Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws - A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA.
L. REV. 252 (1955); Archibald Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel
Tea, 46 B.U. L. REV. 317 (1966); Daniel J. Gifford, Redefining theAntitrustLaborExemp-
tion, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1379 (1988); Handler & Zifchak, supra note 38; Douglas L. Leslie,
Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1980); Bernard D. Meltzer, Labor
Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659 (1965);
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L.
REV. 603 (1976); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Applica-
tion of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963).
40. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) ("The Sherman Act
was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade."); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,
IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945) ("[Antitrust policy] ... seeks to preserve a competitive
business economy .. "); LAWRENCE A. SuLLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
§ 3, at 14 (1977) ("The purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition and to inhibit
monopoly and restraints upon freedom of trade in all sectors of the economy to which these
laws apply."); see also Clarence Fried & William H. Crabtree, Labor, 33 ANTrrRuST L.J.
38, 40 (1967) ("The declared policy of Congress regarding all antitrust legislation is the
preservation and advancement of competition in the marketplace.").
41. Congress' purpose in this regard was described plainly in the preamble to the
NLRA which states:
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce... by encourag-
ing the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designa-
tion of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). The NLRA further provides that employees "have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Id. § 157.
42. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 922 (11th ed.
1991) ("In short, unionization, collective bargaining and standardization of wages and
working conditions are inherently inconsistent with many of the assumptions at the heart of
antitrust policy."); St. Antoine, supra note 39, at 604 ("From the outset, the difficulty in
applying the antitrust concept to organized labor has been that the two are intrinsically
incompatible. The antitrust laws are designed to promote competition, and unions, avowedly
and unabashedly, are designed to limit it.").
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movement is to reduce competition among employees regarding wages and
conditions of employment.43 For example, unions, as a matter of course,
seek agreements with employers that establish uniform terms. One conse-
quence of such uniformity is that the opportunity of any individual employee
to sell his or her services on more favorable terms is foreclosed.' Some
employees are advantaged by such agreements; others' ability to secure a
better individual bargain are limited by such standardization. 45
Examples of union objectives having obvious anticompetitive effects
include uniform wage rates, seniority systems, and hiring halls. Uniform
wage rates - present in most industries with union contracts (other than the
sports industry) - result in a competitive disadvantage for highly skilled
workers who could command a wage greater than the standard rate. Senior-
ity systems and hiring halls similarly disadvantage less senior but more
highly skilled employees.
Collective bargaining agreements between employers and unions are
therefore frequently "contract[s] [or] combination[s] in . . .restraint of
trade" within the literal language of the Sherman Act.' At the same time,
43. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965) ("This Court has recognized that
a legitimate aim of any national labor organization is to obtain uniformity of labor standards
and that a consequence of such union activity may be to eliminate competition based on
differences in such standards.") (citing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503
(1940)).
44. JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.05(c), at 549
(1979). It is a fundamental tenet of labor law that the rights of an individual must yield to
those of the group. The Supreme Court has observed:
But it is urged that some employees may lose by the collective agreement,
that an individual workman may sometimes have, or be capable of getting, better
terms than those obtainable by the group .... [We find the mere possibility that
such agreements might be made no ground for holding generally that individual
contracts may survive [over] collective ones. The practice and philosophy of
collective bargaining looks with suspicion on such individual advantages.
JI. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944); see also HARRY H. WELLINGTON, LABOR
AND THE LEGALPROCESS 130 (1968) (discussing why individual bargaining is not permitted).
45. Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective
Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 9-10 (1971); see
WEiSTART & LOWELL, supra note 44, § 5.05(g), at 562.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). It is clear, however, that Congress' primary purpose in
enacting the Sherman Act was to deal with business monopolies and restrictive trade prac-
tices, not trade union activities. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1940)
("The end sought [by the Sherman Act] was the prevention of restraints to free competition
in business and commercial transactions . . . ."). Indeed, a genuine question exists as to
whether Congress intended the Act to apply to groups of employees at all. See EDWARD
BEMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 51 (1930) ("On the basis of the congressional
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labor-management agreements regarding such matters as wages, seniority
systems, and hiring halls are entirely permissible under the NLRA.47 In-
deed, in view of the fact that such issues normally constitute mandatory
subjects of bargaining under the NLRA,' they are plainly matters about
which national labor policy encourages agreement.
The effort to accommodate these two important yet conflicting national
policies has been left largely to the courts.49 As the Supreme Court has
stated crisply:
[We have two declared congressional policies which it is our responsibil-
ity to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business
economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its
conditions through the agency of collective bargaining. We must deter-
mine here how far Congress intended activities under one of these policies
to neutralize the results envisioned by the other.'0
The contours of the labor exemption have been shaped by the Supreme
Court in a series of decisions wholly outside the sports context." At the
debates... it is believed that no valid evidence can be found in the records of the legislative
proceedings that Congress intended the Anti-trust Act to apply to labor organizations.").
47. Cf. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 666 (acknowledging that labor organizations seek to
obtain "uniformity of labor standards").
48. See Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B.
409, 411-13 (1963) (hiring halls are mandatory subject of bargaining), enforcement granted,
349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966); United States Gypsum
Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112, 114 (1951) (seniority systems are mandatory subjects of bargaining),
modified, 206 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954); 1 THE DEVELOP-
ING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT ch.
17, pts. ll.A, IV.B.1, IV.B.3 (Charles J. Morris et al. eds., 2d ed. 1983 & 3d Supp. 1982-
1986).
49. Having limited the statutory exemption to unilateral union activities, the Court, in
essence, left to the common law the task of formulating standards for the application of the
nonstatutory labor exemption to labor-management agreements with allegedly anticompetitive
effects.
50. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945).
51. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616, 623-26 (1975) (refusing to exempt multi-employer collective bargaining agree-
ment that placed direct restraint on subcontractor market from antitrust scrutiny); Local
Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 688-97 (1965)
(concluding that agreement restricting marketing hours was entitled to labor exemption);
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66, 669 (1965) (concluding that negotiated agree-
ment between union and employer attempting to secure "uniform labor standards" throughout
industry was not exempt from antitrust scrutiny); Allen Bradley Co., 325 U.S. at 808
(concluding that labor unions could not assist nonlabor groups in forming monopolies to
control market); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233-37 (1941) (concluding that
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same time, because professional sports leagues have virtually always re-
strained player movement,' the degree to which player restraint rules might
be sheltered from antitrust review has been an extraordinarily important and
vigorously tested question. As the following section will demonstrate,
litigation challenging such rules in professional sports leagues has prompted
the emergence of a broadly accepted standard for the application of the labor
exemption doctrine. It is this standard that the NFL-NFLPA contract cannot
meet.
2. The Role of the Labor Exemption in Sports Litigation and the
Emergence of Standards for its Application
The significance of the labor exemption doctrine in professional sports
litigation cannot be overstated. During the past two decades, professional
athletes repeatedly have challenged traditional player restraints such as the
player draft,53 reserve clauses,' 4 and free agent indemnity arrangements,55
conventional union activities directed at rival union are not prohibited by antitrust laws);
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503-04 (1940) (explaining that "sit-down" strikes
and wage agreements between unions and employers do not violate antitrust laws). In
December 1995 the Court granted a petition for certiorari in Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 593 (1995). Resolution of the issue
in this case will determine the duration of the labor exemption.
52. See supra note 29 (citing cases involving legality of player restraint mechanisms in
professional sports).
53. The player draft allocates contracting rights to new players among league teams,
traditionally in inverse order of the teams' performance during the prior season. Smith v.
Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
54. Reserve systems traditionally were characterized by a perpetual right in the
employing team to renew the contract of the player and were enforced through no-tampering
agreements. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 259-61 n.1 (1972) (discussing similar
arrangement in professional baseball); WEISTAPT & LOWELL, supra note 44, § 5.03(c), at
505-06 (discussing no-tampering agreements); Simon Rottenberg, The Baseball Players'
Labor Market, 64 J. POL. ECON. 242, 245 (1956) (same).
55. Historically, indemnity arrangements among teams insured that if a player left a
team to play for another team within the league, the original team would be compensated in
the form of a player, draft rights, or money. League bylaws sometimes provided that if the
former team and the acquiring team could not agree on the type or the amount of compensa-
tion the former team should receive, then the determination would be made by the league
commissioner. In essence, the compensation was a forced trade. See WEISTART & LOWELL,
supra note 44, § 5.03(a), at 502-03. These arrangements produced considerable litigation.
For a discussion of the operation of indemnity arrangements, see Mackey v. NFL, 407 F.
Supp. 1000, 1003-05 (D. Minn. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 75-77 (N.D.
Cal. 1974), aft'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Robert-
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arguing that such rules impermissibly operated to restrain their ability to
market their services freely. 6 In response, the various leagues argued, inter
alia, that the restraints were the product of collective bargaining between the
leagues and the player associations, and consequently, that they should be
shielded from antitrust attack by players whose own representatives had
agreed to the arrangements under challenge.'
Out of this controversy, a now broadly accepted standard emerged for
the applicability of the labor exemption in cases challenging collectively
bargained player restraints. Indeed, this standard has been applied uniformly
in all subsequent litigation challenging player restraint rules." The criteria
son v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 873-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In these cases, players claimed
that the forced compensation schemes operated to discourage prospective employing club
owners from hiring available players and therefore restrained player mobility. See WEISTART
& LOWELL, supra note 44, § 5.03(a), at 503.
56. See, e.g., McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904, 905 (E.D. Mich.
1978) (hockey), vacated, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420
F. Supp. 738, 740 (D.D.C. 1976) (football), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D. Minn. 1975) (football),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 872-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (basketball), aft'd,
556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 465 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (basketball).
57. This argument was presaged in a 1971 Yale Law Journal article by Michael Jacobs
and Professor Ralph Winter. See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 45, at 14. The authors argued
that a petition for certiorari had been improvidently granted in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972). Jacobs & Winter, supra note 45, at 28-29. In that case, Curt Flood had been traded
by the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies without consultation and against his
wishes. Flood, 407 U.S. at 265. Rule 9 of the Major League Rules stated that "upon receipt
of written notice of such assignment," the player was "bound to serve the assignee." Id. at
259-61 n. 1. In 6(a) of his Uniform Player Contract, Flood had agreed that he could be so
assigned. Id.
Flood's first and most important cause of action complained that the reserve system
violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 265. Jacobs and Winter, however, responded:
For years the impact of antitrust principles on the arrangements allocating
players among teams in professional sports has been hotly disputed. Now recent
events seem to have brought this issue to a head. A malaise among good athletes
like Curt Flood has increased the tempo of litigation .... We enter this crowded
arena, not to solve the antitrust dilemma, but to put it to rest. For, in the form in
which it is generally debated, it is an issue whose time has come and gone, an
issue which has suffered that modem fate worse than death: irrelevancy.
Jacobs & Winter, supra note 45, at 1.
58. See Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1298-99 (8th Cir.1989) (applying three-part
test for nonstatutory labor exemption), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991); McCourt v.
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979) (same); NBA v. Williams,
THE CASE AGAINST THE NFL-NFLPA CONTRACT
were first formulated by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey v. NFL. 9 There, a
group of active and retired NFL players argued that the then-existing free
agent indemnity system, known as the Rozelle Rule, operated to restrain
players' ability to market their services freely.' The NFL defended the Rule
in part on the grounds that the Rule was incorporated into the collective
bargaining contract6e ' and that proper accommodation of federal labor and
antitrust policy required that the agreement be immunized from antitrust
interdiction.62
The court rejected the League's labor exemption defense.6" In so doing,
it fashioned the following standard for determining when the labor exemp-
tion would shield agreed-upon restraints from antitrust challenge:
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially be
given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on trade
primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship.
Second, federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only
where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining. Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining
is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only
where the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide
arm's-length bargaining.64
857 F. Supp. 1069, 1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same), aft'd, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995), petition
for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 24, 1995) (No. 95-137); Zimmerman v. NFL,
632 F. Supp. 398, 403-04 (D.D.C. 1986) (same); see also Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50
F.3d 1041, 1056-58 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying nonstatutory labor exemption to player
restraint mechanism), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 593 (1995).
59. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
60. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 609-10 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977). The players also claimed that the draft, the standard player contract, the option
clause, and the no-tampering agreement constituted impermissible anticompetitive practices
of the defendants. Id. at 611 n.6.
61. Id. at 612. The 1968 contract between the Association and the League incorporated
by reference the NFL constitution and bylaws, of which the Rozelle Rule was a part. The
1970 agreement, although not referring to the Rule directly, did require that all players sign
the standard player contract. That contract, in turn, provided that the player agreed to
comply with and to be bound by the League constitution and bylaws. Further, representatives
of the Parties testified that it was their understanding that the Rozelle Rule would remain in
effect for the duration of the 1970 agreement. Id. at 612-13.
62. Id. at 612.
63. Id. at 616. The appeal of this case was the first time that a federal court of appeals
considered the immunity issue in the context of professional league sports. See WEISTART
& LOWELL, supra note 44, § 5.06(a), at 576.
64. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614-15 (citations omitted). In applying the labor exemption
test, the Eighth Circuit specifically rejected an argument by the players that the labor
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This formula was distilled neatly from Supreme Court precedent regard-
ing the nature of the labor exemption. For example, with respect to the first
requirement, the Court uniformly had found labor-management agreements
primarily affecting third parties to be outside the labor exemption.65  In
contrast, it had held agreements primarily restraining the parties themselves
to be sheltered by the labor exemption.' Regarding the second element of
the standard, the Court consistently had held that only agreements concern-
ing mandatory subjects of bargaining under the NLRA would be shielded.67
Finally, and most germane to this Article's thesis, the Court had viewed the
purpose of the labor exemption as preserving the integrity of the collective
bargaining process and therefore had found the exemption applicable only
to "bona fide" labor-management agreements.68
exemption extends only to labor or union activities and not to the activities of employers. Id.
at 612.
In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the indemnity arrangdment affected only
the parties to the agreement, and although it was technically an arrangement among owners,
it operated to restrict a player's mobility and to depress a player's salary. Id. at 615, 620.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the rule was related intimately to wages and thus
constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining under the NLRA. Id. at 615.
On the third prong of the labor exemption test, the NFL's defense faltered. The Eighth
Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the lower court's finding that there had not
been "bona fide arm's-length bargaining over the Rozelle Rule" and that the simple accep-
tance of the rule by the union did not serve to immunize it. Id. at 616.
65. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965) ("[A] union forfeits its
exemption ... when ... it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage
scale on other bargaining units."); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S.
797, 808-09 (1945) (stating that agreement between union and employer that attempted to
control markets and prices was outside scope of labor exemption).
66. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
688-89 (1965) (exempting agreement affecting only employer and its unions from antitrust
scrutiny).
67. See id. at 689 (exempting agreement on marketing hours from antitrust scrutiny);
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664 (acknowledging that wage agreement dealt with subject "about
which employers and unions must bargain"); Allen Bradley Co., 325 U.S. at 808 (stating that
§ 6 of Clayton Act does not exempt agreements that attempt to help employer control market
and prices).
68. In Jewel Tea, the Court wrote
Thus the issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours restriction, like
wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours and working
conditions that the unions' successful attempt to obtain that provision through bona
fide, arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not
at the behest of or in combination with nonlabor groups, falls within the protection
of the national labor policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act. We
think that it is.
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Because of its universal acceptance as an accurate formulation of
Supreme Court teachings, the Mackey standard is the proper template against
which to assess the many restraints embodied in the current NFL-NFLPA
contract to determine whether they warrant immunity under the labor exemp-
tion. This Article concludes that they do not.
C. Powell Revisited
In Powell, the question was whether the rules under challenge - the
draft, the right of first refusal, and the standard player agreement - fell
within the reach of the labor exemption, and if they did, whether the labor
exemption continued to shield them even after the Parties' contract had
expired.69 The district court, applying the Mackey standard, held that the
restraints under scrutiny satisfied each element of that test and were insulated
during the life of the agreement. That is, the court found the alleged
restraints to be mandatory subjects of bargaining that affected only the
Parties themselves and to be "in all probability, the product of bona fide
arm's-length bargaining. "70
Regarding the more significant question of the exemption's duration, the
district court held that the exemption survived the expiration of the contract
and continued to insulate any particular issue from antitrust review until the
Parties reached a bargaining impasse regarding that issue.7 On interlocutory
appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's opinion
concerning this latter holding.' The Eighth Circuit held instead that the
exemption continued beyond an impasse and shielded all terms and condi-
tions of employment "conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relation-
ship" from antitrust review.73 Put simply, the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also In re Detroit Auto
Dealers Ass'n, 955 F.2d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 1992) (endorsing FTC's determination that
primary purpose of exemption is to preserve integrity of collective bargaining process);
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 612 n.10 (8th Cir. 1976) ("To preserve the integrity of the
negotiating process, employers who bargain in good faith must be entitled to claim the
antitrust exemption.") (quoting Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847
n.14 (3d Cir. 1974)), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
69. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 782 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
70. Id. at 784. Indeed, on appeal, the Parties did not disagree that the expired agree-
ment met the three-prong test for antitrust immunity. Powell, 930 F.2d at 1298-99.
71. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 788-89 ("[A] determination that the parties have reached
impasse as to a particular issue results in termination of the labor exemption protecting that
particular provision.").
72. Powell, 930 F.2d at 1304.
73. Id. at 1303.
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Powell effectively meant that as long as the NFL and the NFLPA maintained
an "ongoing collective bargaining relationship," disagreements regarding
player mobility would be resolved only through collective bargaining and
labor law, and would be exempt from antitrust review.74
The Powell holding as to the duration of the labor exemption gave rise
to a vigorous scholarly debate.75 As a practical matter, however, it meant
74. See NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying labor exemption to
player restraint system), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 24, 1995)
(No. 95-137). In Williams, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
endorsed the Eighth Circuit's approach and similarly applied the nonstatutory labor
exemption to unilaterally maintained player restraint mechanisms - including the draft the
right of first refusal, and the revenue sharing/salary cap system - in the NBA for as long
as the NBA and the NBA Players Association's collective bargaining relationship existed.
Id. at 686, 688-93.
Most recently, in Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir 1995), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 593 (1995), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit articulated the breadth of the exemption somewhat differently - but to
the same effect - and held that the labor exemption continues to shelter unilaterally
enforced player restraints that are "imposed through the collective bargaining process, so
long as such restraints operate primarily in a labor market characterized by collective
bargaining." Id. at 1056.
75. See, e.g., Lock, supra note 32, at 395-400 (arguing that duration of exemption
should be coextensive with Parties' collective bargaining agreement); Ethan Lock, Powell
v. National Football League: The Eighth Circuit Sacks the National Football League
Players Association, 67 DENY. U. L. RIv. 135, 153 (1990) (arguing that exemption should
end at bargaining impasse); Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust
Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEo. L.J. 19, 62-63
(1986) (arguing that labor exemption should insulate all conduct by either party to bargain-
ing relationship that pertains to mandatory subjects of bargaining); Bradley R. Cahoon,
Note, Powell v. National Football League: Modified Impasse Standard Determines Scope
of Labor Exemption, 1990 UTAH L. REv. 381, 401-06 (arguing that exemption should end
when parties reach "modified impasse"); Kieran M. Cochran, Note, When Does the Buzzer
Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
1045, 1071-75 (1994) (arguing that exemption should shield agreement until it is "clearly
unreasonable" for parties to believe disputed provision will appear "in that form in succeed-
ing agreement"); Michael S. Hobel, Note, Application of the Labor Exemption After the
Expiration of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports, 57 N.Y.U. L. RPv.
164, 196-97 (1982) (arguing that- labor exemption should continue to shield agreement
beyond bargaining impasse as long as good faith bargaining continues); Daniel C. Nester,
Comment, Labor Exemption to Antitrust Scrutiny in Professional Sports, 15 S. ILL. L.J.
123, 144 (1990) (arguing that exemption should end at bargaining impasse); Note, Releas-
ing Superstars from Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, 104
IIARv. L. REv. 874, 888-94 (1991) (same); Jonathan S. Shapiro, Note, Warming the Bench:
The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in the National Football League, 61 Fo1inHAm L. Rnv.
1203, 1233 (1993) (arguing that exemption should end at bargaining impasse). This
question regarding the duration of the labor exemption should be resolved by the United
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that the NFL's continued implementation of the first refusal/compensation
scheme - as well as Plan B76 - would be insulated from antitrust challenge
for as long as the players remained represented by the NFLPA. 7
D. NELPA Disavowal of Collective Bargaining
The lesson of the Powell holding was not lost on the NFLPA, which
moved swiftly to terminate its status as the players' collective bargaining
representative. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Powell was rendered on
November 1, 1989. On November 3, 1989 the NFLPA Executive Commit-
tee voted to abandon collective bargaining in order to nullify the labor
exemption defense.7" Thereafter, more than nine hundred of the approxi-
mately fifteen hundred NFL players signed petitions revoking the authority
of the NFLPA or any other organization to engage in collective bargaining
on their behalf.79 On December 5, 1989 NFLPA "player representatives
from the twenty-four NFL teams met and unanimously voted to end the
NFLPA's status as the players' collective bargaining representative. "' They
also enacted new bylaws under which "no officer, employee or member of
the NFLPA [would be] authorized to discuss, deal or negotiate with the NFL
or any of its member clubs or their agents.""
These maneuvers, of course, were invited by the Powell decision and
were designed unabashedly to end the "ongoing collective bargaining rela-
tionship" between the NFL and the NFLPA. To insure this nonrepresen-
tative status, the NFLPA reorganized itself as a trade association and revised
its bylaws specifically to prohibit collective bargaining with the NFL.' The
Association also filed a "labor organization termination" notice with the
United States Department of Labor and was reclassified by the Internal
Revenue Service from a labor organization to a business league.3
States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir.
1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 593 (1995).
76. See Pash, supra note 22, at 3-4 (explaining details of Plan B).
77. This teaching was later confirmed by the Second Circuit's decision in NBA v.
Williams, which held that unilaterally maintained player restraint systems will be insulated
for as long as the collective bargaining relationship exists. Williams, 45 F.3d at 692-93;
see also Brown, 50 F.3d at 1056-58.
78. Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354, 1356 (D. Minn. 1991).
79. Id. at 1354 n.1.
80. Id. at 1354.
81. Id. at 1356.
82. Id. at 1354.
83. Id.
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In withdrawing their representation rights from the NFLPA, 4 the play-
ers accomplished their goal of eliminating any continued application of the
labor exemption - the only remaining obstacle to individual antitrust chal-
lenges to the player restraint rules.' Those challenges immediately fol-
lowed.
E. "Plan B" and the Players' Response: McNeil v. NFL
and White v. NFL
In February 1989 while the Powell case was pending, the NFL, presum-
ably recognizing that the first refusal/compensation scheme then in place was
vulnerable to antitrust attack, unilaterally implemented its so-called "Plan
B. ,86 Under Plan B, teams were allowed to "protect" thirty-seven of their
fifty-five players by applying the first refusal/compensation system to those
players. The remaining players were accorded free agency status and were
permitted to negotiate freely for their services.'
After being released from the "ongoing collective bargaining relation-
ship," Freeman McNeil and seven other players filed an antitrust lawsuit in
April 1990 against the NFL, challenging Plan B. 8 In September 1992 a
federal court jury found Plan B violative of the antitrust laws and awarded
damages of $1.63 million and unrestricted free agency to four of the eight
player plaintiffs.89
84. See James W. Quirm, A Look at the McNeil Litigation, PRAc. L. INST., Mar.-Apr.
1993, at 3 (discussing NFLPA's withdrawal as players bargaining representative). In fact, the
NFLPA only withdrew as the players' bargaining representative, id., and was not decertified
pursuant to an NLRB election. Moreover, the Association's later renaissance and the League's
recognition of that representative status after the terms of the agreement were reached also were
accomplished without an NLRB election. The Parties, however, referred to the NFLPA as
having been recertified. Paul Domowtich, NFL Halts Jones' End-Around Try at Cutting Own
Merchandising Deal, Fr. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 11, 1993, at 6. This evidence, at the
least, does not detract from an inference that the relationship between the League and the
Association was less than arm's-length and that consequently their agreement was less than
"bona fide."
85. Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (D. Minn. 1991). The district court
declared that "[blecause no 'ongoing collective bargaining relationship' exists, the court
determines that (the] nonstatutory labor exemption has ended." Id.
86. The designation grew out of two bargaining proposals - "Proposal A" and
"Proposal B" - offered by the NFL during collective bargaining in the fall of 1988. Pash,
supra note 22, at 3-4. "Proposal A" included increased benefits and a revised first re-
fusal/compensation system. Id. at 4. "Proposal B" granted unrestricted free agency to some
players while freezing benefits at their then-current levels. Id.
87. Id.
88. McNeil v. NFL, Civ. No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992).
89. Id. at *1; Sandomir, supra note 23, at 5.
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The barrier to individual player antitrust lawsuits against the NFL had
burst. Within two weeks, Reggie White and four other players lodged a
similar federal suit against the NFL seeking free agency and damages.'
The McNeil award and the prospect that other federal courts would find
similarly in favor of White and countless additional players,91 prompted the
League to seek a swift and comprehensive reconciliation with the NFLPA.
The reason for the League's courtship of the NFLPA was plain: As long as
the NFL and the NFLPA had an "ongoing collective bargaining relation-
ship" - and especially if they had a contract providing for player restraints
- any individual player challenge to those restraints would be foreclosed
under the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. In the absence of that
relationship, the League faced the certain fate of repeated and likely success-
ful challenges to Plan B and any other player restraint scheme. The
NFLPA, likewise desirous of reaching a contract and re-emerging from its
defunct status, agreed to a settlement in the White case,' and in the process,
bound its members to a remarkably lengthy seven-year collective bargaining
contract containing numerous significant player restraints. On February 26,
1993 a comprehensive settlement of the White litigation was reached. The
two-hundred page settlement agreement contained the specific terms of the
Parties' current collective bargaining agreement and included the contentious
issues of the salary caps and the franchise player designation.93
Immediately thereafter, the NFLPA began efforts to reconstitute itself
as the players' collective bargaining representative; Association representa-
tives asserted that a majority of players supported the NFLPA. 4 Shortly
thereafter, they announced that player support was sufficient so that the
League could lawfully recognize the NFLPA without an NLRB election.95
90. White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Minn. 1993).
91. Immediately after the McNeil decision, Keith Jackson and nine other players
obtained a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against the League's
continued maintenance of Plan B. This relief enabled Jackson and three other players to
negotiate freely with any NFL club for the 1992 season. Jackson v. NFL, 802 F. Supp. 226,
235 (D. Minn. 1992); Shapiro, supra note 75, at 1213.
92. Regarding the role of the NFLPA in the White settlement, see infra part V.
93. Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D.
Minn. 1993) (No. 4-92-906). In fact, the essential terms of the Parties' settlement and
agreement were reached in late December 1992. See Mark Asher, NFL, Players Reach
Tentative Deal, Ending 5-Year Impasse; Free Agency Greatly Expanded, WASH. POST, Dec.
23, 1992, at B1.
94. NFLPA Set to Recertify as Union, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, at C10.
95. NFL's Looking to Add Roster Strategy, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 23, 1993,
at D2.
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397 (1996)
By early April 1993 the NFLPA stated that collective bargaining negotiations
with the League would soon be completed. 6 In early May 1993 the NFL
and the NFLPA jointly announced the completion of the agreement pending
player ratification. 7 By late June 1993 the ratification process had been
completed, and the Parties formally executed their collective bargaining
agreement.9" As a final, albeit ministerial, matter, the district court ap-
proved the Parties' settlement agreement. 99
IV. The Parties' Bargain and Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it .... o
The infirmity in the above-described sequence of events may be simply
stated: Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, employers may not lawfully
96. Domowitch, supra note 84, at 6.
97. NFL Owners, Union Agree to 7-Year Deal, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., May 7, 1993,
at Dl.
98. Aikman Out 2 Months After Back Surgery, WASH. POST, June 19, 1993, at G2;
NFL, Players Make Their Deal Official, CALGARY HERALD, June 30, 1993, at F8.
99. White v. NFL, 836 F. Supp. 1508, 1510-11 (D. Minn. 1993), aft'd, 41 F.3d 404
(8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2569 (1995). In its approval of the Parties' agree-
ment, the district court, accepting the Parties' mutual representations, made the following
remarkable findings, none of which was true:
(a) The NFLPA has been lawfully formed and selected by the players to
serve as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all present and
future NFL players.
(b) Neither the NFL nor any of its members have taken any action which in
any way hindered or supported the formation of the NFLPA as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of all present and future NFL players.
(c) The NFL and its member clubs have lawfully recognized the NFLPA as
the players' exclusive collective bargaining representative.
(d) Accordingly, the NFLPA is fully authorized and empowered to enter into
a new collective bargaining agreement with the NFL and its member clubs.
Id. at 1498.
The court, in a raw exercise of judicial power, granted the Parties' joint motion to
enjoin permanently all pending and future actions by class members challenging the agree-
ment. White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1433-35, 1436-37 (D. Minn. 1993). By this, the
court allowed itself to become the enforcing mechanism for the Parties' collusive and anti-
competitive arrangement.
100. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8(a)(2), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994)).
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recognize or bargain with employee representatives until a majority of the
employees themselves have selected that representative.'' This prohibition
is an outgrowth of both our national experience with so-called "company
unions" and Congress' judgment that employees - not their employers or
unions - should determine who represents them." When an employer
recognizes and bargains with a union before a majority of the employees
have demonstrated their support for that union, the employer commits a per
se violation of Section 8(a)(2)." Similarly, the union in such an arrange-
ment likewise interferes with employee free choice and violates Section
8(b)(1)(a) of the NLRA.1 4
From its inception, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) consis-
tently has applied Section 8(a)(2) to condemn management involvement in
or on behalf of labor organizations."0 Indeed, the NLRB's unwavering
enforcement of the prohibition has been described as maintaining "a strict
101. See ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731, 737-38
(1961) (holding that granting exclusive bargaining status to agency selected by minority of
employees constituted violation of § 8(a)(2)).
102. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, employers facing the prospect of unionization
often created or fostered organizations ostensibly to represent employees' concerns regarding
wages, working conditions, or grievances. Such organizations were thought to interfere with
employees' freedom to select their collective bargaining representatives and the prohibition
of those organizations was, unquestionably, Congress' primary objective in enacting § 8(a)(2)
of the NLRA. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEM ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 195 (1976).
103. Indeed, it has been observed that "[a] labor organization may be recognized as
bargaining representative for all employees only when it has been, in the terms of section 9(a)
of the Labor Act, 'designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes.'" Id. at 203 (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994)); see also Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp., 366 U.S. at 737-38
(holding that granting exclusive bargaining status to agency selected by minority of employees
constituted violation of § 8(a)(2)); NLRB v. Clappers Mfg., 458 F.2d 414, 418 (3d Cir.
1972) (enforcing order finding violation of § 8(a)(2)).
104. The NLRA states, "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
157 of this title.. . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1994). For examples of court cases
finding violations, see NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 434
U.S. 335, 346-49 (1978) (finding violation of NLRA); Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp., 366
U.S. at 737-38 (same); Ellery Products Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1388, 1388 (1964) (same);
Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 910, 910-11 (1964) (same).
105. See generally Julius Getman, The Midwest Piping Doctrine: An Example of the
Need for Reappraisal of Labor Board Dogma, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 292 (1964); Note, New
Standards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82 YALE L.J. 510 (1973)
[hereinafter New Standards]; Note, Section 8(a)(2): Employer Assistance to Plant Unions and
Committees, 9 STAN. L. REv. 351 (1957).
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397 (1996)
dichotomy between labor and management." 1" So plain is the prohibition
of Section 8(a)(2) that intent plays no role in its application. 7
In the instant matter, the NFL bargained and reached an agreement with
an organization - the NFLPA - that was neither lawfully recognized nor
certified by the NLRB. To the contrary, the NFLPA was officially and
purposely no longer the players' representative when the significant terms
of the contract were reached. This undisputed fact alone establishes the
illegality of the Parties' conduct.
It will likely be pointed out that after the settlement in White, the
Association was reconstituted as the players' representative,10 8 and by this
it will be argued that the players ratified their representatives' prior agree-
ment. The infirmity in this argument, however, is as plain as the unlawful
Parties' conduct: As a matter of settled law, the Parties could not retroac-
tively sanitize their unlawfully created agreement.
In 1LGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 0 9 the Supreme
Court faced precisely the same facts as those presented here. There, the
employer recognized and bargained with a union in the good faith but
106. New Standards, supra note 105, at 510-11; see also Ansin Shoe Mfg. Co., 1
N.L.R.B. 929, 935 (1936) (stating that statutory prohibition against management domination
and interference with labor organizations "must be broadly interpreted to cover any conduct
upon the part of an employer which is intended to bring into being, even indirectly, some
organization which he considers favorable to his interests").
The labor-management dichotomy has been made sweeping by this broad statutory
interpretation and the definition given to the term "labor organization": "any organization
of any kind ... in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994). In interpret-
ing this broad definition, the Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S.
203 (1959), that a committee organized by the employer to provide "a procedure for consider-
ing employees' ideas and problems of mutual interest to employees and management," id. at
205, was a labor organization under the NLRA. Id. at 218. The Court concluded that the
statutory phrase "dealing with" went beyond mere "bargaining." Id. at 210-13. Therefore,
because the committee discussed such matters as job classification, holidays, vacations, and
similar matters, the organization existed at least in part for the purpose of "dealing with" the
employer regarding terms and conditions of employment. Id. at 213-15. In this case, there
can be no dispute that the NFL "dealt with" the NFLPA regarding "rates of pay" and
"conditions of work" when the NFLPA was not the players' freely selected representative.
107. See ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731,739 (1961) ("We find nothing in the statutory
language prescribing scienter as an element of the unfair labor practices here involved."); see
also Clappers Mfg., 458 F.2d at 418 (unlawful employer domination found "although his
intentions may have been exemplary").
108. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95 (discussing reformation of NFLPA as
Players' collective bargaining representative).
109. 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
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mistaken belief that the union enjoyed the support of a majority of employ-
ees. Later, after the union had obtained documented majority support, the
employer and the union reached a formal collective bargaining agreement.
The Court, however, held that the after-acquired majority support did not
remove the taint of the earlier unlawful recognition and noted that the em-
ployer's improper recognition itself created "a deceptive cloak of authority
with which to persuasively elicit additional employee support."" 0
In Bernhard-Altmann, the Supreme Court addressed and condemned
exactly the same sequence followed by the NFL and the NFLPA in reaching
their current agreement. In both matters the employer and the union negoti-
ated collective bargaining agreements at times when the unions did not
represent a majority of employees and later attempted to ratify those improp-
erly created agreements. Just as this conduct was found illegal in Bernhard-
Altmann, so must it be determined here."' The actions of the NFL and the
NFLPA interfered with the players' statutory right to freely select their own
representatives - a patent violation of the NLRA.1 2  Consequently, the
collective bargaining contract was not only unlawfully created, it was the
antithesis of a bona fide, arm's-length agreement."' As such, it cannot
provide the Parties and their agreement refuge from antitrust scrutiny."1
4
110. ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731,736 (1961).
111. In a thinly veiled effort to avoid their legal obligations, the Parties agreed in the
White settlement that after reorganization of the NFLPA, they would together petition the
court for a determination that the NFLPA "was lawfully formed and selected by the players
to serve as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all present and future NFL
players" and "that neither the NFL nor any of its members have taken any action which in
any way hindered or supported the formation" of the NFLPA. White, 856 F. Supp. at 1498.
112. In NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335
(1978), the Court observed that "both [the] union and employer commit unfair practices when
they sign a collective-bargaining agreement recognizing the union as the exclusive bargaining
representative when in fact only a minority of the employees have authorized the union to
represent their interests." Id. at 344.
113. In In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 973 (1992), the Sixth Circuit found an agreement between the dealers and their
employees limiting marketing hours to be outside the nonstatutory labor exemption on the
grounds that the agreement was reached to avoid unionization and arm's-length bargaining
and thus was not the product of arm's-length collective bargaining. Id. at 467.
114. There remains an important question as to which players could lodge such an
antitrust action. Although a full exploration of this question is beyond the scope of this
Article, the following observations seem warranted: First, because the White matter was
concluded by settlement and not by litigation, no collateral estoppel effect could attach to the
district court's findings. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) ("When
an issue of law or fact is actually litigated ... the determination is conclusive in a subsequent
action between the parties.. . ."); CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
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V The Role of the NFLPA in White
It will likely be argued that because the NFLPA was not a plaintiff,
defendant, or intervenor in the White litigation, its role in the settlement
could not be deemed to have been collective bargaining on behalf of NFL
players. The following facts, however, demonstrate that notwithstanding the
district court's findings to the contrary," 5 the NFLPA's involvement in
PROCEDURE § 4419, at 177 (1981) ("Basic statements of the requirements for issue preclusion
demand that the issues have been both actually litigated and actually decided."). At most,
there could be claim preclusion, or res judicata, effect accorded the district court's approval
of the White settlement.
In addition, it is noteworthy that Judge Doty could not decide the res judicata effect of
his own judgment. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 73 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1973)
(noting that deciding res judicata effect of settlement in class action suit "necessarily requires
a hindsight approach to the issue of adequate representation"); Cherner v. Transitron Elec.
Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48, 53 (D. Mass. 1963) (recognizing that court hearing particular suit
cannot determine binding force of that action); Note, Binding Effect of Class Actions, 67
HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1060 (1954) ("Mhe binding force of a particular action cannot be
determined accurately by the court which hears the class suit .... "). Thus, any challenge
to the court's findings - for example, that conflict of interest considerations or inadequate
representation deprived the absent class members of due process rights - necessarily would
be litigated in another forum.
In this instance, the wide disparity of interests among players calls into question the
appropriateness of the class designation as well as the adequacy of representation. As one
court noted, "With a class thus sharply divided in opinion it would be absured [sic] to say that
the leader of one faction in the internecine struggle could adequately represent the whole
membership." Ford v. Metropolitan Dist. Council, 323 F. Supp. 1136, 1140 (E.D. Pa.
1970). Indeed, in Tice v. Pro Football, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1993), one of the
many cases settled in White, Judge Royce Lamberth described several "serious concerns"
about the adequacy of class counsel and the named representatives, potential conflicts among
class members, and most significantly, the actions of the NFL and the NFLPA in settling
White without consulting counsel for the named Tice plaintiffs. Id. at 257-59. These facts
and arguments raise substantial questions as to whether Judge Doty's determinations ought
to be given res judicata effect by another court.
Judge Doty, in keeping with his heavy-handed approach to White, enjoined any future
litigation of the issues raised in that matter. White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1433-35,
1436-37 (D. Minn. 1993). This injunction against future litigation by all class members
presents a serious disincentive to continued litigation by class members. At the same time,
however, nothing in the White settlement or Judge Doty's order can preclude antitrust
challenges to the contract - and the advancement of the thesis of this Article - by NFL
players entering the League after the conclusion of the White litigation. Nonpresent players
and absent class members cannot be bound by an action to which they were not a party. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34(3) (1982) ("A person who is not a party to an
action is not bound by or entitled to the benefits of res judicata .. .).
115. The district court made the following conclusion:
[Tihe NFLPA's role in the settlement negotiations leading to the Stipulation and
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White was so significant and intimate that the Settlement Agreement itself
constituted a collectively bargained agreement between the NFL and the
NFLPA.
First, even a cursory review of the Settlement Agreement shows the
significant activity of the NFLPA. Not only did the NFLPA finance the
White litigation, it was a named party in some of the twenty-two cases
designated as "Related Litigation" '16 that were settled simultaneously with
White. Moreover, the NFLPA specifically agreed to be bound by the terms
of the Settlement Agreement.117 In addition, the League agreed to pay more
than eighteen million dollars to a fund benefitting the NFLPA for expenses
incurred in the prosecution of White,"' as well an additional ten million
dollars in settlement of the related litigation to which the NFLPA was a
party." 9 Next, the NFLPA, along with members of the White class, agreed
as part of the settlement not to sue the League on antitrust grounds over any
"term or condition of employment" contained in the Settlement Agree-
ment.120 The NFL likewise agreed not to sue the NFLPA or any plaintiff
class member over any claim asserted in the litigation.12 ' Finally, the
NFLPA, along with the plaintiff class and the defendants, pledged
their best efforts and cooperation to secure Court Approval of this Agree-
ment; to defend the Agreement or Court Approval of the Agreement in
any forum in which they may be challenged; and to implement the provi-
Settlement Agreement does not provide a basis on which to disapprove of the
settlement. Both this court and the General Counsel of the NLRB have concluded
that by sponsoring various lawsuits, the NFLPA was not thereby acting as the
players' collective bargaining representative.
White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1430 (D. Minn. 1993).
116. Stipulation and Settlement Agreement at art. I(u) and App. A, White v. NFL, 822
F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993) (No. 4-92-906).
117. In Article XX, § 2 of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, the NFLPA, along
with the NFL clubs, agreed to be "bound by and have the benefits of the Agreement and the
Final Consent Judgement." id. at art. XX, § 2. Indeed, in a letter to Commissioner
Tagliabue, attached at Appendix B to the Settlement Agreement, Mr. Upshaw wrote:
This letter confirms that the National Football League Players Association,
which has financed the above-referenced litigation and is a party in certain of the
related litigations which are simultaneously being settled in conjunction with the
above referenced litigation, agrees that it will be legally bound by the terms of the
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, dated February 26, 1993.
Id. at app. B.
118. Id. at art. XII, § 6.
119. Id. at art. XII, §§ 4,8(c).
120. Id. at art. XIX, § 1.
121. Id. at art. XIX, § 2.
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sions of the Agreement in a manner consistent with good faith and fair
dealing. 122
These facts plainly establish that the NFLPA negotiated the terms of the
White Settlement Agreement and was, in fact, a party to it. It is, in short,
simply inconceivable that the NFLPA, whose fights and interests were
affected so greatly, was not a principal part of that settlement. 1  Indeed,
shortly after the agreement was first announced in January 1993, Mr.
Upshaw declared, "[Flor the first time, the players are the partners of the
owners. "1
24
The remaining question, then, is whether these actions constituted
collective bargaining. The NLRA states:
[TMo bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement,
or any question arising thereunder .... 125
This language describes precisely what happened when the NFL and the
NFLPA negotiated the terms of the White Settlement Agreement. That
Agreement resolved all of the major, long-standing issues of contention
between the NFL and the NFLPA including the college draft provisions,
122. Id. at art. XIX, § 6.
123. See Note, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in
Professional Sports, 94 COLUM L. REv. 1045, 1045 (1994) (noting role of NFLPA in White
settlement negotiations). The role of the NFLPA in the White litigation and settlement was
so widely recognized that observers uniformly characterized the NFLPA as a party to it. For
example, a recent Columbia Law Review note examining the question of the duration of the
labor exemption stated:
The importance of this issue was most recently illustrated by the pro-
tracted labor negotiations between the National Football League Players Associa-
tion (NFLPA) and the National Football League (NFL). On January 6, 1993, the
NFLPA and the NFLMC came to terms on a seven year collective bargaining
agreement.
Id. at 1045; see also Gerald Eskenazi, NFL Labor Accord is Reached, Allowing Free Agency
for Players, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at Al, B15; Michael S. Kagnoff, While Free Agents
Reap Benefits of NFL Labor Settlement Agreement, Rookies Get Set for Further Legal Battles,
I SPORTS L.J. 106 (1994).
124. Pete Foley, Can the NFL and the Players Be Successful as Partners?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 1993, § 8, at 9.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
126. Stipulation and Settlement Agreement at art.IV, White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389
(D. Minn. 1993) (No. 4-92-906).
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the rookie salary cap provision,"z the free agency procedures and restric-
tions," franchise player rules," and, most importantly, the salary cap
provisions."3° That these matters so affect wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment as to be mandatory subjects of bargaining under
the NLRA is beyond debate. Indeed, as has been noted already, the NFLPA
itself recognized the character of its agreement by specifically promising to
refrain from suing the NFL on antitrust grounds over any "term or condition
of employment" contained within the Settlement Agreement.13 ' These
provisions, agreed upon in January and February of 1993 as part of the
White Settlement Agreement, then reappeared in the NFL-NFLPA collective
bargaining contract announced by the NFL and the NFLPA in May.
Under these circumstances, for the district court to assert that "the
parties did not engage in collective bargaining prior to the NFLPA's refor-
mation as a union"'3 or that collective bargaining did not begin between the
NFL and the NFLPA until March 31, 1993' bespeaks either a fundamental
misapprehension of collective bargaining or a desire to settle the law suit so
powerful as to require that the facts be ignored.34
127. Id. at art. V.
128. Id. at art. VII.
129. Id. at art. VIII.
130. Id. at art. X.
131. Id. at art. XIX, § 1.
132. Whitev. NFL, 836 F. Supp. 1458, 1499 (D. Minn. 1993), aff'd, 41 F.3d 404 (8th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2569 (1995).
133. White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1397 (D. Minn. 1993).
134. Judge Doty was heavily involved in the settlement of the White matter. Thus, on
January 6, 1993 the New York Times reported that
United States District Judge David Doty monitored six hours of negotiations
today betveen representatives of the National Football League's owners and players
and told both sides that if they did not settle their five-year-old labor dispute on
Wednesday he would rule on the motions before his court.
Both parties, who met in Doy's courtroom from 10 A.M. to 4 P.M., were
summoned last week by Doty after a tentative settlement initially trumpeted by both
sides appeared close to collapsing. The primary issue is the players' demand for
a comprehensive free-agency plan that would allow players to move freely ....
"It's at a very, very sensitive area of negotiation," said Doty of the talks.
"They are going on their way from here but will continue to work and talk and
respond to me by tomorrow. I gathered from them ideas on how to compromise.
I had them separated at times. Tomorrow if they don't come together, all bets are
off."
Thomas George, Judge Decides to Put A Deadline on Deadlock, N.Y. ItM s, Jan. 6, 1993,
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What happened in this case is transparent. The NFLPA terminated its
status as collective bargaining representative so that players could lodge
substantive antitrust challenges against the NFL and avoid the labor exemp-
tion. It then negotiated the settlement of White while simultaneously dis-
claiming representative status. Although its sponsorship of White and other
litigation might not, by itself, have transformed the NFLPA into the players'
collective bargaining representative,' 35 its negotiation of a collective bargain-
ing agreement completed its metamorphosis.
VT Survival of the Claim
As one final and revealing argument, the Parties may be expected to
note that the six-month statute of limitations under the NLRA 36 has elapsed,
and accordingly, whatever illegality may have attended their conduct in
1993, the statute of limitations precludes any NLRA challenge to the agree-
ment's formation.
Putting aside any contention that the Parties' ongoing application of the
contract and its many restraints renders their conduct a "continuing" viola-
tion of the NLRA, 137 any reliance on the statute of limitations is beside the
atBll.
135. The court described the General Counsel of the NLRB as having "concluded that
by sponsoring various lawsuits, the NFLPA was not thereby acting as the players' collective
bargaining representative." White, 822 F. Supp. at 1430. This citation was to a June 26,
1991 memorandum addressing the question whether the NFL's continued recognition of the
NFLPA after its disclaimer and reorganization constituted a violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2)
of the NLRA by interfering with a rival union's efforts to organize NFL players. The quote
upon which the court relied stated:
In addition, the fact that the disclaimer was motivated by "litigation strategy," i.e.,
to deprive the NFL of a defense to players' antitrust suits and to free the players
to engage in individual bargaining for free agency, is irrelevant so long as the
disclaimer is otherwise unequivocal and adhered to.
Memorandum from Robert E. Allen, Assoc. General Counsel to NLRB, to Gerald Kobell,
Regional Director Region Six, No. 6-CA-23143, 1991 WL 144468, at *4 n.8 (N.L.R.B.G.C.
June 26, 1991). In this case, of course, the NFLPA's disclaimer was not adhered to.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1994) ("[N]o complaint shall issue based upon any unfair
labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the
Board .... .").
137. Although an argument might be made that the annual application of the contract's
restraints to players, including new players, constitutes a "continuing" violation of the
NLRA, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted that theory under the Act. In a highly
analogous case to that present here, the Court held that the unfair labor practice occurred
at the time of the illegal recognition, thus barring an unfair labor practice charge filed more
than six months later. Local Lodge No. 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S.
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point. In order for the Parties' collective bargaining agreement to avoid
antitrust scrutiny under the labor exemption to the antitrust laws, that agree-
ment must be the product of "bona fide, arm's-length" negotiations. This
requirement exists so that labor and management cannot evade the antitrust
laws by subterfuge. As the Supreme Court has nicely written, "[B]enefits
to organized labor cannot be utilized as a cat's-paw to pull employers'
chestnuts out of the antitrust fires." ' In this case, it cannot be said the
NFL-NFLPA agreement is the product of bona fide, arm's-length collective
bargaining, regardless of whether or not the NLRB prosecuted the matter.
Just as the Parties cannot sanitize their unlawful conduct by declaration,
neither does the passing of the statute of limitations make their agreement
"bona fide." 
39
The fact remains that the Parties, in their mutual self-interest, entered
into an agreement in plain violation of an important national labor policy -
that employees freely select their own representatives.Y4 Their conduct
411, 419 (1960). There, the fact that the contract continued in force until the date of the
filing of the charge did not make the violation a "continuing" one. Id. at 422-23.
138. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)
(citing Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945)); see also
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 294 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Women's
Sportswear, 336 U.S. at 464).
139. See 51 AM. JuR. 2d Limitation of Actions § 22 (1970) ("The general rule in this
respect, supported by the great preponderance of the authorities on the subject, is that a
statute of limitations operates on the remedy directly only and does not extinguish the
substantive right."). In this regard, it bears remembering that the passing of a statute of
limitations affects neither the unlawfulness of an underlying wrong nor the moral obligation
of the wrongdoer, but only the remedy of one party to recover. Thus, an express or implied
contract barred by the running of the statute of limitations is revived solely by the acknowl-
edgment of its existence by the party to be charged. See also Lockerby v. Sawyer, 189
N.W. 989, 990-91 (Mich. 1922) (permitting estate owed money by beneficiary to set off
notes evidencing debt against bequest - even though statute of limitations had run).
140. It is for this reason that the district court's injunction against all actions by class
members challenging the agreement, supra note 114, will not prevail. It is axiomatic that
a "prerequisite for the maintenance of a class suit is that the named representatives fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the absent class members." JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CML PROCEDURE § 729 (2d ed. 1993). This is especially true where, as here, the
interests of the Parties in reaching the settlement agreement and the interests of many class
members in alleviating the effects of the player restraint mechanisms were in sharp conflict.
For example, in the leading case of Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), the Supreme
Court held that plaintiffs seeking to challenge racially restrictive covenants were not bound
by a prior judgment enforcing those covenants, id. at 44-46, "because their interests had not
been adequately represented by class representatives whose objectives had been to establish
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breached that policy and their resulting contract cannot properly be charac-
terized as a bona fide, arm's-length agreement.
VII. Conclusion
The lady doth protest too much, methinks.14'
The Parties were well-versed in this law and fully aware of the unlaw-
fuilness of their conduct. Thus, in an astonishing display of hubris and
duplicity, they began their contract as follows:
PREAMBLE
This Agreement, which is the product of bona fide, arm's-length collec-
tive bargaining, is made and entered into on the 6th day of May, 1993,
in accordance with the provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act .... 142
Notwithstanding their protestations to the contrary, however, the NFL
and the NFLPA, in settling their legal battles, agreed upon the terms of a
collective bargaining contract at a time when the Association was officially
decertified and no longer the players' union. Thus, their agreement was not
the product of bona fide, arm's-length collective bargaining, and as a conse-
quence, its anticompetitive provisions, including salary caps and the fran-
chise player designation, are subject to antitrust attack.
the validity of the covenant, rather than to strike it down." FRIEDENTHAL, supra, § 731.
141. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act El, sc. ii, 1.225. (Harold Jenkins ed.,
Methuen 1982).
142. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 1993-2000, pmbl., at 1.
